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ABSTRACT 
In recent decades the U. S. Senate has made increasing use of 
complex unanimous consent agreements (UCAs) to set a time for a final 
vote on legislation (thereby precluding filibusters) and to specify, 
for example, who may offer what amendments. Because of the numerous 
dilatory tactics permitted in the absence of a UCA, controversial 
legislation is typically doomed unless a prior agreement has been 
reached. Thus the norm of consent to unanimous consent requests 
(UCRs) is puzzling. This paper addresses the puzzle with a decision-
theoretic model of consent which yields what appears to be a rather 
stringent condition for objection to a UCR. Two actual cases of 
objection are analyzed and seem quite consistent with comparative 
statics results derived from the model. A concluding discussion 
considers UCAs as instances of endogenously chosen institutions which 
provide Senate leaders with opportunities to induce cooperative 
behavior. 
• 
UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENTS: GOING ALONG IN THE SENATE 
Keith Krehbiel 
California Institute of Technology 
"If you want to get along, you've got to go along. " "Be a 
workhorse, not a showhorse. " "Freshmen are to be seen, not heard. " 
Congressional scholars are likely to be as familiar with such 
statements as with Fiorina's Keystone or with Mayhew's Electoral 
Connection. But if recent first-hand observations are any guide, the 
good old days may be gone. Howard Baker, the recently retired Senate 
Majority Leader, claims that "leading the Senate is like trying to 
push a wet noodle. " And his successor, Bob Dole, apparently concurs: 
"There's a lot of free spirits in the Senate. About 100 of them. ,,l 
Quips and quotes about the good old days are common in American 
politics, notwithstanding persuasive evidence to the contrary such as 
Polsby's (1968) accounts of cane-beatings, hunting dogs, fisticuffs 
and discharged pistols in the early House of Representatives. 
Regardless of whether these are good or bad days in the Senate, there 
is relatively little disagreement that some "norms" or "folkways" 
(Asher, 1973; Matthews, 1960) have changed over the years (Rhode, et 
al, 1985 ) ,  and that even in the "old days" norms were not constants of 
legislative behavior (Huitt, 1961) . While members typically obey the 
unwritten rules of the chambe1·, sometimes they bend them, and 
occasionally they break them. 
This paper reconsiders norms from a rational choice perspective 
in a narrowly defined setting. Its empirical motivation is that with 
increasing frequency U.S. senators face situations in which they can 
unilaterally kill legislation by objecting to a request that it be 
considered under a unanimous consent agreement. 2 Yet instances of 
this seemingly effortless obstruction are rare. Is it because 
senators are habitually well-behaved, or is there an alternative 
explanation? Combining theory and two case studies, I make an 
argument for the alternative explanation that senators obey the "norm 
of consent" only if it is consonant with their individual long-term 
interests. 
Part I is an overview of unanimous consent agreements (UCAs) and 
perspectives on congressional norms. Part II introduces a decision 
theoretic model of a senator's choice of consent or objection to a 
unanimous consent request (UCR) . Part III applies the model to two 
cases from the Senate. And part IV summarizes the study and presents 
some broader implications. 
I. UCAs AND THE NORM OF CONSENT 
2 
A unanimous consent request is a proposal to break rules. A 
unanimous consent agreement is a UCR that receives no objections and 
therefore supplants the standing rules of the Senate. UCAs may be 
simple or complex. Simple UCAs are reached perfunctorily and are 
used, for example, to rescind quorum calls, to insert material into 
the Congressional Record, to add senators as co-sponsors of bills, and 
to allow staff members to enter the chamber during debate. Simple 
UCAs are always entered into verbally and are usually inconsequential 
in the passage of legislation. 
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The focus of this study is on complex UCAs, which are proposed 
orally but are written and published in the Record, the Senate 
Calendar, and whip notices. Such agreements are typically products of 
careful negotiations between senators who have a special interest in 
the legislation to which the agreements pertain. They may specify the 
rules for debate, who controls debate, the order of measures to be 
taken up, germaneness restrictions for amendments, and time 
limitations for almost any conceivable motion (such as amendments to 
amendments, motions to table or to commit, appeals, and points of 
order) . So important are these latter functions� including most 
notably the setting of deadlines for a vote on final passage � that 
complex UCAs are often called "time limitation agreements" (Keith, 
1977, p. 142) . 
The strong resemblance between complex UCAs in the Senate and 
special rules in the House is indisputable, however there is one 
crucial distinction. A single senator can kill a unanimous consent 
request, whereas even a sizable minority of House members is helpless 
against a minimal winning coalition that favors a special rule. Why, 
then, are objections to UCRs so rare? Responses to the question take 
two forms, the first of which is informative but easily rejected and 
the second of which is examined in greater detail, modified, and 
ultimately used in developing a theory of consent. 
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The first possible explanation is based on reversionary rules 
(cf. Romer and Rosenthal's (1978) reversionary policy) . The argument 
is that a senator who contemplates objection to a UCR is likely to be 
deterred because he views a UCA as a mere superimposition of a new set 
of rules onto an existing set to which the Senate can and will revert 
if he objects to the agreement. Thus, a senator may expect that to 
object to the UCR would at best defer consideration of the bill he 
opposes. Such reasoning is plausible only if senators are ignorant of 
the standing rules of the Senate - a proposition with which few 
congressional scholars would be comfortable, not to mention Senators 
Byrd, Dole, Long, etc. In fact, the reversionary rules are � 
attractive to potential objectors than are UCAs, whereas UCAs almost 
always impose time constraints. Of the normal Senate rules, in 
contrast, Oleszek (1984) writes that "if the Senate strictly observed 
every rule, it would become mired in a bog of parliamentary 
complication (p. 156) ,"  which is precisely what an opponent of 
legislation wants. 3 Thus the reversionary rules reinforce the 
temptation to object to unanimous consent requests, so the puzzle of 
consent persists. 
A more common explanation for the prevalence of consent stems 
from the sociological notions of norms or folkways. In spite of their 
widespread use, such terms are rarely defined with sufficient 
precision to yield testable propositions about narrow questions such 
as why senators "go along" with unanimous consent requests. But two 
differing (if not competing) perspectives on norms provide some usefUl 
insights. 
In its extreme form, the first perspective takes norms as 
exogenous, stable, "institutionalized" codes of behavior. Norms are 
perceived as so strong that they may be considered institutional 
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features in their own right. Indeed it is not uncommon for proponents 
of this view to assert that norms as unwritten rules are more 
important to understanding Congress than are Congress's formal 
(written) rules. Consider, for example, White's (1956) statement in 
Citadel, in which he equates norms with "tradition". 
All that is really necessary to know about [the rules of the 
Senate] • • • is that not all of them together have one-tenth the 
force of simple tradition, the tradition that some things are 
done and some are not done (p. 59) . 
Matthews (1960) takes a less extreme view in which norms are not 
exogenous per se, but rather are attributed in part to a common desire 
of members to maintain their institution. For example, he writes that 
if "senators took full advantage of their opportunities for debate and 
discussion, the tempo of action would be fUrther slowed, ,, hence they 
behave consistently the norms by refUsing to "play to the galleries" 
(p. 94) . Similarly, his account for senatorial courtesy is that 
" • conflict does exist, but its sharp edges are blunted by the 
felt need -- expressed in the Senate folkways - for courtesy" 
(p. 95) . And the message is stronger still in his conclusion that 
"normative rules of conduct -- called here folkways - exist in the 
Senate • • •  because they perform important functions" (p. 100) . In 
sum, to the degree that norms are explained at all, the form of 
explanation is often fUnctionalistic: senators obey the folkways of 
the Senate because to do so meets the needs of the Senate. 4 
If in contrast norms are to be potentially useful in predicting 
congressional phenomena, then a further drawback of the view of norms 
as institutionalized codes of behavior is the tendency to treat them 
as constants. If they were, then of course they could not be 
explained nor could they be useful as explanations for other 
congressional phenomena. But norms are not constant, neither within 
nor across legislatures. This point is convincingly illustrated 
throughout Wolfinger•s (1972) study on filibusters, in which he 
concludes 
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My point here is that this solicitude [towards Rule 22] • • •  
varies significantly with the exigencies of the legislative 
situation (which is not so surprising) and the characteristics of 
those senators whose prerogatives are subject to violation. 
(p. 124) 
The extension to the present study is straightforward: coincident 
with observable variations in "the exigencies of the legislative 
situation, " so too should we see variation in the degree to which 
norms are observed. Depending on one's substantive focus, norms may 
be properly regarded as either dependent or independent variables, but 
the key point is that they do vary. Reformulation and reconsideration 
of norms in this light may therefore purchase some heretofore 
unexploited predictive leverage. 
The first step towards clarifying the predictive possibilities of 
norms is to depart from the perspective of norms as codes of behavior 
to one in which norms are viewed as strategic responses to formal 
rules, motivated Qy preferences. An implicit feature of this 
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perspective is that congressmen appear to be observing norms (codes of 
behavior) not merely because it is "how things are done around here" 
(Hinckley, 1985 , p. 150) , but rather because selective compliance with 
and violation of norms are strategies through which members expect to 
reach individual goals (presumably long-term goals in the case of 
consenting to UCRs) . That such rational behavior corresponds to 
normatively appealing behavior, namely cooperation, is a satisfying 
byproduct of goals and institutional design, even though strictly 
speaking it is mere coincidence. 5 
My preference for the strategic perspective on norms should now 
be clear. It is not particularly important that I prefer the phrase 
"strategic responses to formal rules, motivated by preferences" to the 
more concise but ambiguous term "norms". The more important challenge 
is to demonstrate that the strategic perspective is uniquely capable 
of explaining variation in the norm of consent to UCRs (where "norm" 
hereafter means typical but not universal behavior) . The reason the 
strategic perspective is promising is a variation on the theme of 
variation (sic) . Since preferences, institutions and policies change, 
so too should strategic responses to them. If in turn cooperative 
behavior in Congress (of which consent to UCRs is surely a special 
case) is a product of norms qua strategies, then deviations from such 
tendencies to cooperate ought to be predictable. Thus the 
reformulated question: when and why will a rational senator deviate 
from the norm of consent? 
II. A THEORY OF CONSENT 
The theory focuses on an individual senator who must decide 
whether to consent or to object to a UCR. He must select one of two 
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strategies. Strategy a represents consent (going along), and strategy 
p represents objection (violation of the norm of consent). Although 
the theory captures the essential elements of a senator's decision to 
obey or to violate a norm, it obviously is not intended to reflect the 
full institutional and strategic complexity of the Senate. 
By assumption (formally specified below), the senator is tempted 
to object to a UCR for a pending issue x, because he prefers no change 
in policy (the status quo, denoted x) to the bill that he expects to 
A 
be passed if a UCA is reached (denoted x). On the other hand, he is 
constrained from objecting because there exists some other issue y on 
A -
which he prefers a new bill, y, to the status quo, y. (Note that 
tildes always refer to status quo points on the given issue; hats 
always represent the senator's expectation of the bill's final form. ) 
If the senator objects to the UCR on x it necessarily lowers his 
expectation of getting a new bill on issue y. Finally, the senator 
believes that his choice of a or p on the UCR for issue x can affect 
the probabilities of the full Senate's ultimate selection of policy 
outcomes on both x and y, and he behaves rationally in accordance with 
his probability estimates of the effects of his actions. 
For the two issues (x and y), the four relevant policy outcomes 
- A - - A A A -
(x, y), (x,y), (x, y), (x, y) -- and associated subjective 
probabilities of occurrence are illustrated in figures 1 and 2. The 
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senator's estimates of the probabilities are defined as: 
p Pr(i'la) 
q 
,. 
Pr Cy la) 
p'= Pr(xjp) 
A 
q'= Pr(ylp) 
Thus, by necessity, 
1-p 
1-q 
the probability that no bill passes on x 
if he consents to the UCR, 
the probability a bill passes on y 
if he consents to the UCR, 
the probability that no bill passes on x 
if he objects to the UCR, 
the probability that a bill passes on y 
if he objects to the UCR. 
Pr(�la) 
Pr(yla> 
A 
1-p'= PrCxlp> 
1-q'= Pr(ylp), 
each of which has the obvious interpretation. Note that p terms 
always refer to issue x, q terms always refer to issue y, terms 
without primes presume the senator's consent (a), and terms with 
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primes presume his objection (jl). By construction, and as illustrated 
in figure 1, the possible outcomes are both mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive under either strategy. 
The labels assigned to payoffs in figure 1 correctly suggest that 
the formal characterization takes on the flavor of a repeated play 
prisoner's dilemma game, even though only one actor's behavior is 
modeled explicitly. Choice of the strategy of consent (a) is 
analogous to cooperation, while objection (jl) is a form of defection. 
Accordingly, the terms describing the outcomes in figure 1 are 
duplications or variations of those in Axelrod (1984). Senators are 
tempted to object to a UCR because to object kills the bill on issue 
x. Given objection, retaliation may or may not occur during future 
consideration of issue y. If other senators do not retaliate, the 
gamble pays off, a bill is passed on y, and the senator receives the 
maximum TEMPTATION payoff. (Utilities are introduced below. ) 
12 
However, if retaliation does occur -- such as an objection by another 
senator to a UCR on issue y � the status quo remains in effect on 
both issues. The senator therefore receives the PUNISHMENT payoff: 
his immediate gain from violating the norm of consent on issue x 
results in a subsequent penalty on issue y. 
The larger set of outcomes under consent contains variations of 
reward and sucker payoffs. _
A 
Rewards for consent, -- outcomes (x, y) and 
A A  
(x, y), -- occur whenever a bill is passed on issue y. If a bill on x 
does not pass in spite of the senator's consent to its UCR (for 
example, if someone else objects), then the consenting senator 
receives the LUCKY REWARD payoff. He is lucky on issue x and his 
cooperation is subsequently rewarded by unanimous consent to consider 
an ultimately passing bill on issue y. But if he is less fortunate on 
x but nevertheless wins on y, the NORMAL REWARD is the payoff from the 
A A 
pair of bills, x and y. 
Of course the senator cannot expect rewards to occur with 
certainty. If he consents to the UCR for x but his consent is not 
reciprocated, he will have been suckered. Either his payoff is that 
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of a LUCKY SUCKER (if he wins on x but loses on y), or a DOUBLE SUCKER 
(if he not only is suckered into consent on x but also is double-
crossed on y) • 
Formally, the assumptions are: 
Al. Minimal temptation. On issue x the senator prefers the 
- A 
status quo, x, to the expected bill, x. 
A2. Nontrivial time horizon. There exists a future issue y on 
A 
which the senator prefers y to y. 
A3. Ob1ection is deadly. p' = 1. 
A4. Ob1ection is probabilistically costly. q' < q. 
AS. Separable, Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. 
For x = x,� and _
A 
y = y, y, there exist utility functions 
u, u1 and u2 such that u(x, y) = u1(x) + u2(y). 
Assumption 1 is self-explanatory. Assumption 2 loosely resembles 
Axelrod's "shadow of the future" in that the senator is interested in 
passing some bill after issue x is considered. (Either of these could 
be omitted in a more general treatment, but the results would be 
relatively uninteresting. ) Assumption 3 embodies the power of 
objection and reinforces the temptation to object, while assumption 4 
captures the potential future costs of present objection. Assumption 
S provides for normalized payoffs, represented as utilities. In 
particular, assumptions 1, 2, and S permit assignment of payoffs as 
follows: 
A 
u(x, y) 
u(x, y) 
l, 
ii. 
A _  
u(x, y) = 0, 
A A A 
and u(x, y) = u, where 
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- A. 0 < u, u < 1. 
Additionally, assumption S implies an expected utility representation 
of the decision. Given strategies a (consent) and p (objection), a 
senator chooses consent if and only if 
Eu(a) 2 Eu(p) 
and, conversely, chooses objection if and only if 
where 
and 
Eu(p) > Eu(a), 
Eu(a) 
Eu(p) 
_,.. pqu(x,y) p(l-q)u(x,y> + 
A A A -
(1-p)qu(x,y) + (1-p)(l-q)u(x,y), 
+ 
- A. - -p'q'u(x,y) + p'(l-q')u(x,y) + 
A A. A. -
(1-p')q'u(x,y) + (1-p')(l-q')u(x,y). 
Thus a senator's decision about whether to consent or to object to a 
UCR for issue x is determined by the relative values of his expected 
utility terms, given in equations (1) and (2). 
As figure 2 illustrates, equations (1) and (2) are unnecessarily 
general in light of other assumptions. Normalization ensures that 
,.._ u(x,y) = 0, and deadly objection (A3) precludes the possibility of 
,.,.. ,. _ outcomes (x,y) and (x,y) whenever a member objects to the UCA for 
issue x. Consequently, the decision tree contains only six terminal 
nodes, and equations (1) and (2) can be simplified as: 
Eu(a) 
Eu(j3) 
A 
pq + p(l-q)u + Cl-p)qu 
q • + c1-q • >u 
(1,) 
(2.) 
(1) 
(2) 
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Now subtraction of (1') from (2') produces the senator's decision 
rule: 
p -
,.. 
<=> q' - pq + [(1-q')-p(l-q)]u - (1-p)qu 0 (3) 
The inequality states the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
objection (p) to a UCR on issue x and is the basis for the more 
concise and interpretable result that follows. 
Theorem. A senator will object to a unanimous consent request on 
issue x if and only if 
Proof. See Appendix • 
!! 
A. 
u 
q - q' 
> (3,) 
1 - p 
There are several ways to interpret the result. First suppose 
that senators are sure of the consequences of their acts. 
Specifically, they know that p = O (consent is tantamount to surrender 
on x), q = 1 (consent ensures victory on y), p' = 1 (objection kills 
x), and q' O (objection on x always invokes punishment on y). 
Substituting these values into (3') immediately produces u� > 1 as a 
condition for objection (j3). This further implies that 
A 
j3 <=> u - u > O. Separability (AS) permits expansion of this 
A. A. 
simplified condition to p <=> u(x) + u(x) - u(y) + u(y) > o, which 
after reordering produces the intuitive result that objection occurs 
if and only if 
- A u(x) - u(x) 
A. -
u(y) - u(y), 
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i.e., whenever the net benefit from killing the bill on x exceeds the 
net benefit from passing the bill on y .  This rather obvious result 
for an extraordinarily tidy world introduces an important theme that 
recurs under less restrictive conditions : rational senators weigh 
short- and long-term factors when making an immediate decision. In 
this case, only if the costs of certain loss in the future are 
exceeded by the benefits of certain victory in the present will a 
senator violate the norm of consent . 
A second, less restrictive interpretation imposes only one 
element of certainty, namely certain punishment (q' = 0). Now (3') 
simplifies only to 
.!! 
A. 
u 
> 
q 
1 - p 
The imposition of the expectation of certain punishment can be 
interpreted as an assumption on the part of the senator that there is 
always at least one other senator who will play tit-for-tat . In such 
circumstances a rational senator systematically compares his relative 
-- A. A.  evaluations of outcomes (x,y) and (x, y) with his relative estimates of 
A. A. 
the probabilities that bills x and y will pass if he consents. 
Suppose we set one of the two ratios equal to one. If for example the 
senator contemplates consent and estimates that the corresponding 
probabilities that � and � will be passed are equal (q = 1-p), then he 
will object to the UCR for x if and only if u 
A 
u, which means that he 
prefers no bills at all to the bundle of bills . Similarly, if he is 
A. 
indifferent between both bills and no bills (u = u), then the only 
circumstances under which he will object to the UCR on x is when he 
A A 
regards y as less likely to be passed than x, i . e . ,  when q < 1 - p. 
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In sum, two forces can instigate violations of the norm of consent in 
a world of sure punishment : a strong preference for the status quo 
over a package of bills, and/or pessimism about the prospects of 
passage of the second bill in spite of consent to consider the first. 
While each of the above interpretations imposes special 
restrictions, the centrality of long-term and short-term costs and 
benefits in the decision calculus extends to the more general case, as 
is illustrated by two additional interpretations which impose no 
special restrictions. 
Reordering (3') as 
(q - q.) .!! (1 - p) A 
u 
allows situations to be represented on a unit square on which the 
(3 •• ) 
horizontal axis (1 - p) is the senator's expectation of loss on issue 
x under consent, and the vertical axis (q - q' ) is the net probability 
loss on issue y from objection. As figure 3 illustrates, (3'') 
implicity defines a line that necessarily passes through the origin 
and has slope rr�. A. Thus for any given ratio of u to u, the 
corresponding line is a set of points of minimal consent. Moreover, 
such lines always partition the square into regions of consent and 
A. 
objection . The strategy of a senator with any given values of u and u 
is therefore determined by his probability assessments (1-p) and 
(q-q') . He will object only if the pair of values represents a point 
q-q' l 
Probability loss 
on issut y 
frcm obJection 
Figure 3 
lnttrprttation of the Condition for Objtction* 
0 
0 
a 
Constnt region 
- A 
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u ) u 
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below the minimal consent line. 
The geometric interpretation can be used to illustrate several 
comparative statics results that are derived below. The most visually 
intuitive of these is the ceteris paribus effect of a change in the 
- A 
slope of the line, which would be induced by a change in u or u (or 
both) . Because a decrease in the slope of the consent line 
necessarily shrinks the area of objection, a senator's increasing 
A A 
assessment of two bills (x and y) and/or decreasing assessment of no 
bills (x and y) can change his strategy in at most one way: from 
objection to consent. Actual instances of such changes are presented 
in part III, but before turning to them it is useful to expand and to 
clarify the relativey loose geometric representation with a standard 
comparative statics exercise on the condition. 
The objective is to state the condition in a form from which 
potentially testable propositions can be derived. Let E = Eu(p) -
Eu(a) , the senator's net expected utility from objection. Reordering 
the condition in the theorem and setting it equal to E yields 
E 
A A - -q'u - qu + u - pu (4) 
Stated generally, the question of interest is: how will a change in 
- A 
any given parameter (u, u, p, q or q') affect a senator's net expected 
utility (E)? Total differentiation of (4) provides the answers. 
dE M du + aE d� + aE dp + aE dq + � dq • au a� ap aq aq' 
- ,.. _ ,.. ,.. (1-p)du + (q'-q)du - udp - udq + udq' (5) 
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The five partial derivatives in (5) have natural interpretations. 
Each states the precise effect on E of a change in a given parameter, 
holding all other parameters constant. Incorporating our knowledge of 
the range of values and the substantive meaning of such parameters 
enables us to state five corresponding propositions. (The 
propositions are stated in terms of changes in the senator's net 
expected utility from objection, but the obvious converses hold.) 
Ceteris paribus: 
Pl. An increase in a senator's evaluation of the no bills 
outcome will increase his net expected utility from 
objection, because 
aE/au (1-p) > o. 
P2. An increase in a senator's evaluation of the two bills 
outcome will decrease his net expected utility from 
objection, because 
" 
aE/au (q'-q) 0 (by A4). 
P3. An increase in a senator's estimate that no bill will pass 
on x if he consents will decrease his net expected utility 
from objection, because 
CJE/ap - u < o. 
P4. An increase in a senator's estimate that a bill will pass on 
y if he consents will decrease his net expected utility from 
objection, because 
iJE/aq 
,. 
- u < o. 
21 
PS. An increase in a senator's estimate that a bill will pass on 
y if he objects will increase his net expected utility from 
objection, because 
aE/aq• 
,. 
u > o. 
While most if not all of the propositions are consistent with 
informal intuitions about senators' behavior, they convey more 
information than mere common sense or geometric representations yield. 
The following cases were selected to determine whether such 
information is useful. 
III. TWO CASES 
The obvious obstacle to testing the theory is that techniques for 
- ,. 
measuring u, u, p, q, and q' are unknown or at least not readily 
available. Consequently, empirical analysis is necessarily subjective 
and is based on a small sample. The discussion does serve at least 
two and possibly three purposes, however. First, descriptions of the 
cases provide a richer view of how complex unanimous consent 
agreements are reached in the contemporary Senate. Second, the 
attempt to interpret senatorial behavior lets us assess whether the 
formal terms of the theory have empirical referents. And finally, the 
joint focus on theory and observation provides a minimal opportunity 
to reject the theory or, barring rejection, to discover important 
omissions that might be incorporated into future extensions. 
22 
Case!: Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1983. On October S, 
1983, Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker interrupted a pending motion 
regarding authorizations for the Department of State to introduce a 
unanimous consent request for S. 1529, an act that would create a paid 
diversion plan to induce dairy farmers to produce less milk, and make 
adjustments in the acreage allotment and marketing quota systems in 
federal tobacco programs. 6 It immediately became clear that the 
proposed UCR was ambiguous about the amendments to be permitted. 
Senator Melcher (D-HT) reserved the right to object to the request, 
and his key concern coincided with that of several senators from 
agriculture intensive states. Melcher questioned whether amendments 
pertaining to target prices for commodities such as wheat, corn, 
cotton or rice would be permitted during debate of the dairy and 
tobacco act. Baker's response was frank. 
Yes, Hr. President. The bill will be open to amendment in 
general, as it is under the rules of the Senate. I know that, in 
addition to the dairy-tobacco bill, there is a serious 
controversy that revolves around the target price issue, which I 
believe is the subject of another bill. Target prices, of 
course, could be offered to this bill as an amendment unless w' 
provided by unanimous consent that that would not be the case. 
This evoked an outright objection from Senator Exon CD-NB) , which 
Melcher subsequently elaborated upon: 
I am not at all happy with the situation . • •  that an amendment 
dealing with the target prices on wheat or other commodities 
would be offered • • • 
Baker attempted to accomodate Melcher, inquiring how "the Senator 
[would] react if a unanimous consent agreement were entered into that 
would forbid a target price amendment to this bill?" Exon responded 
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favorably. 
I would withdraw my objection to taking up the bill if we could 
get a unanimous consent agreement that it would be on tobacco and 
dairy only and if there were a prior agreement on the matter of 
target prices that would not come up as an amendment thereto. 
Although the preferred agreement seemed to be one resembling a 
closed rule, Senator Dole (R-KS) then entered the chamber and Baker 
correctly anticipated that Dole would have something to say on the 
matter of target prices for wheat. Consistent with Melcher, Exon and 
Zorinsky, Dole wanted to ban all amendments on target prices, however 
he "would not consent that we cannot offer amendments to the tobacco 
and dairy bill. " In other words, he wanted a guarantee of strict 
germaneness: amendments should be permitted, but only if they pertain 
to the immediate content of the bill, namely dairy and tobacco 
farming. 
The situation became more complicated and tense when objecting 
(or objection-threatening) senators drew attention to the possiblity 
that a trade had been arranged between Agriculture Secretary Block and 
senators from dairy and tobacco states. According to Zorinsky CD-NB) , 
the Agriculture Committee chairman, Senator Jesse Helms CR-NC) , and 
its members had met with Block, 
who attempted to initiate a quid pro quo in agreeing to what he 
called a very bad dairy bill, if, in effect, we would deliver to 
him sufficient votes to offset the money there, to take it out of 
the hiie of the wheat people in putting a target price freeze on 
wheat. 
Charges and counter-charges occupy several pages in the Record, 
but a description of the outcome and interpretation of how senators' 
likely preferences and subjective probabilities encouraged objection 
24 
is more important for present purposes than is a continued summary of 
the debate. The winners of the immediate dispute were the senators 
who objected to the original UCR. The renegotiated agreement stated 
that "no amendments relative [sic] to target prices or loan rates 
relating to commodities other than dairy or tobacco shall be in order" 
(p. 13617), which is precisely the narrowly applied germaneness rule 
that Dole requested. 
The situation is depicted formally in figure 4, which helps 
account for the objections to the original UCR. The original bill 
pertained to dairy and tobacco policy, which for purposes of 
exposition is collapsed onto one dimension, x1• The second dimension, 
x2, represents target prices for other commodities (wheat, cotton, 
rice and corn) . From a narrow perspective, the Agriculture 
Committee's bill was an attempt to change policy only in a pro-dairy 
- A 
and tobacco direction, from x1 to x1 on the horizontal axis. However, 
senators from states affected by target prices were not particularly 
interested in dairy and tobacco and consequently had a broader 
perspective. Familiar with the rules of the Senate in which 
germaneness is conceived more broadly than in the House, these 
senators behaved as if the status quo were the two-dimensional point, 
x, which provided for moderately high target prices and moderate 
support for dairy and tobacco farmers. The key point is that the 
outcome they expected to result under the original UCR consisted in a 
change in .l<HQ. directions -- more favorable programs for dairy and 
tobacco farmers (about which they cared little) and reductions in 
x2: 
l&rgtt Pricts 
ior wht&t, 1tc. 
Figurt 4 
Obj1ctors' Pr1i1r1ncts &nd P1rc1ptions oi UCR5 
for tht O&iry &nd Tob&cco Adjustm1nt Act 
i2, -
i2 
Xj Xl 
Xj: 
Support for O&iry 
&nd Tob&cco F&ratrs 
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target prices (about which they cared a great deal) . Therefore, as 
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represented by the eliptical indifference curves, the policy change in 
- A 
the two-dimensional space from x to x was highly undesirable under the 
initial unanimous consent request.9 
What, then, did the objectors gain in the second UCR, and how 
well does it conform to the theory presented in the previous section? 
The "proposal germaneness" (Shepsle, 1979) provision they sought and 
attained has a simple spatial interpretation : it confines the set of 
permissible amendments to a subspace � in this case, to the x1 
dimension represented by the dotted line passing through x. Once 
objecting senators were assured that policy on the target price 
dimension, x2' would remain fixed at x2 during consideration of 
S. 1529, their expected outcome too could change only in the horizontal 
direction. Therefore, � in figure 3 represents their expectation 
under the second unanimous consent request. 
,... 
The geometric representation of the location of x on a much 
A 
higher utility contour than x has a precise analogue in the theory, 
A 
namely a positive change in x, which, holding y constant, can be 
A 
treated as a positive change in u. Proposition 2 states that 
A 
aE/au = (q'-q) < 0, meaning that holding other parameters constant, a 
positive change in the value of the projected outcome will make 
objection less attractive. Although we obviously have no precise 
gauge for the initial or terminal states of the relevant senators' 
calculations, we can look more closely at both the theory and the 
situation to guess how responsive the initial objectors were likely to 
A 
have been to the change in u that presumably resulted from the new 
UCR. 
The substantive interpretation of the proposition is that the 
magnitude of reduction in a senator's net expected utility from 
objection is proportional to his expectations of punishment (1-q') 
and/or likelihood of reward (q) . The intensity of the debate during 
the initial UCR and the broader legislative setting provide insights 
into the likely values of the key terms. Although the two factions 
sparred over short-term procedural issue, they were nevertheless 
natural allies when it came to the long-term substantive issue of 
continued support for American agriculture. Recall that Baker's 
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introductory remarks included an allusion to a separate bill on target 
prices that was pending. Thus initally objecting senators probably 
believed that there was a high probability of punishment if their 
objections were to have permanently killed the Dairy and Tobacco Bill. 
Theoretically, this suggests a large 1-q' (probability of punishment, 
given objection) and by necessity a small q'. Similarly, on the 
consent side of the equation senators probably believed that to 
cooperate on the Dairy and Tobacco Bill would be rewarded later in the 
session when target prices were to be considered independently. 
Therefore q was probably reasonably large and, following through, q'-q 
was large and negative. 
The formal upshot from these impressionistic assessments is that 
A 
each of the likely values -- a large positive change in u, a high q, 
and a low q' -- would produce a large negative change in E, thereby 
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making objection a much less attractive strategy under the second UCR. 
It therefore seems plausible (with plausibility inversely proportional 
to the dubiousness of the interpretation) that the eventual observed 
change to compliance with the norm of consent is consistent with the 
theory. 
Case 1: Martin 1uther K.!!!& Holiday. HR 3706, a bill to create a 
national holiday in honor of Martin Luther King, Jr., passed with 
strong support (338-90) of members on the House of Representatives on 
August 2, 1983. Senate leaders had hoped to act on HR 3706 on October 
3, but their plan was aborted when Senator Jesse Helms launched a 
filibuster just as the bill came to the floor under the normal rules. 
The leadership of both parties responded by filing for cloture. The 
vote on cloture was scheduled for October S, but even if cloture had 
been successful, the number of amendments was sufficient to tie up the 
Senate as it was trying to conclude its business before the Columbus 
Day recess. Given these constraints, Howard Baker mounted a last 
ditch effort to circumvent the normal rules by proposing that the bill 
be considered under a unanimous consent agreement. He was somewhat 
pessimistic when introducing the request. 
Mr. President, as I indicated last evening, I wish to propound a 
unanimous consent request. I am by no means sure that it will be 
agreed to and, as a matter of fact, I have been advised that it 
probably will not be agreed to. However, I would like to go 
ahead and propound the request at this time • • • 
The provisions of Baker's initial UCR were: 
• the pending cloture vote would be vitiated 
• the Senate would consider HR 3706 at 10 a.m. on October 18, 
1983 
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• Senator Helms would be recognized to offer a motion to commit 
the bill to the Judiciary Committee 
• debate on the bill would be limited to four hours 
• amendments may be offered b¥6 debate would be restricted to 
one hour for each amendment 
• debate on second degree amendments, appeals, points of order, 
or other motions would be restricted to thirty minutes 
• final passage would occur on or before 2 p.m. on Wednesday, 
October 19 and 
• "that the agreement be in the normal form.#11 
Most of the provisions are self-explanatory and were not 
controversial. Although the provision setting a time for final 
passage would preclude a filibuster and therefore was potentially 
objectionable to opponents of the bill, somewhat surprisingly, the 
last provision became more important. Immediately after the UCR was 
proposed, Baker expounded on "the normal form" by stating that "no 
amendments would be in order except amendments that were germane to 
the bill itself.# This led Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) to reserve 
the right to object, presumably because he wanted more details on the 
amendments that would be permitted under the UCR. Humphrey's claim 
was that 
it is certainly not my wish to delay the final passage of the 
bill. I do, however, object to the provision which, if I 
understood it correctly, sets a time certain for final passage. 
As one of the opponents of the bill, I intend to offer one or two 
amendments. 
Baker was reluctant to offer a guarantee to Humphrey that his 
amendments could be considered. When the presiding officer asked 
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whether Baker wished to modify his request, he responded: 
No, Mr. President, I do not. The request was negotiated with 
many Senators over a long period of time and is a package. And, 
honestly, I think if I were to modify it to accomodate the wishes 
of the Senator from New Hampshire -- which is a perfectly 
legitimate request -- • • •  it would make the agreement 
unacceptable to a number of Senators because there would no 
longer be any practical limit on the length of time that could be 
consumed in the debate on this measure • • • •  So, without a time 
certain, I am afraid that the arrangement would fall apart. 
In the subsequent debate it became clear that Humphrey did not 
object to the provision of the UCR setting a time for final passage, 
but merely wanted a reasonable assurance that his amendments would be 
considered. Interestingly, even Senator Helms exhorted Humphrey not 
to object. After a few minutes of formal negotiation, Senator Baker 
suggested the absence of a quorum. During the first quorum call, the 
conferring senators were unable to reach a new agreement, so Senator 
Moynihan requested another quorum call to allow the informal 
negotiations to continue. When a new tentative agreement was reached, 
Baker asked and received unanimous consent that the quorum call be 
rescinded (an example of a simple UCA) , and proposed a modified UCR 
which ultimately satisfied Senator Humphrey. There were only three 
changes in the second UCR. Two of them extended the allotted time for 
debate (moving to 9 a.m. the time at which the bill was to be taken up 
and extending to 4 p.m. the time by which a final vote was to be 
taken). The third change waived paragraph 4 of rule XII, thereby 
permitting the new UCR to be agreed to in the absence of a quorum 
(since few Senators were on the floor when the new agreement was 
negotiated). 
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The example illustrates the practice of bending but not breaking 
the norm of consent by reserving the right to object without rejecting 
outright. The case also raises two difficult questions. First, why 
did Humphrey nearly object to the proposed agreement and then withdraw 
his objection? And perhaps more puzzling, why did Helms, who had 
previously filibustered against the King holiday, give his consent to 
the UCR that made continued filibustering impossible? A closer 
examination of the case, including preceding and subsequent events, 
provides tentative answers to these narrow questions and has broader 
implications for leadership strategy. 
A reading of the Record makes it clear that Humphrey's strategy 
of threatening to object to the UCR resulted in his right to propose 
two amendments that otherwise would not have been considered. But the 
fit between the facts and the theory is not immediately obvious 
whereas Humphrey seemed not to expect that his amendments would 
pass.12 For example, he introduced one amendment by saying, 
Mr. President, I am under no illusions. A colleague observed to 
me a moment ago that this bill is unamendable, that you could not 
even amend the pledge of allegiance to the bill, and I believe he 
is probably correct (Congressional Record, October 19, 1985, p. 
S104) . 
To explain his change from objection to consent, therefore, 
requires an expanded interpretation of a proposition derived from the 
theory. Suppose that a senator's assessment of an outcome is 
influenced not only by the policy that results from the law but also 
from the means by which the collective choice was made -- more 
specifically from the position-taking opportunities afforded by the 
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agenda as constructed by the UCA. The evidence suggests that Humphrey 
A 
accepted x as a foregone conclusion, but nevertheless valued greatly 
an agreement that permitted him to offer two amendments during which 
he could make his position for economical operation of government 
known.13 So while the revised UCR changed neither his probability 
estimates nor his assessments of policies, it did offer him concrete 
position-taking advantages. Loosely, then, the change can be 
A A A 
interpreted as an increase in the u (x) component in u, where u (x) 
includes opportunities for position-taking in addition to the value 
associated with the expected bill. Proposition 2 suggests that such a 
change should decrease the attractiveness of objection, which is 
consistent with his change in behavior from near objection to consent. 
On its surface, Helms's consent to the UCR for the Martin Luther 
King Holiday seems inconsistent with the theory. He strongly 
- A 
preferred no holiday (x) to a holiday (x) , and had previously 
filibustered the bill. Yet when the UCR which set a time to vote for 
final passage was proposed, he did not object. The key to 
understanding Helms's consent is Baker's scheduling strategy, the 
likely effects of which are consistent with propositions 4 and S. Two 
points are revealing. First the UCAs for both the King Holiday and 
the Dairy and Tobacco Act were negotiated on October S. Second, 
Baker's proposed UCR for the King holiday immediately preceded the UCR 
for the Dairy and Tobacco Act. Combined with the crowded legislative 
calendar and approaching Columbus Day recess, this sequencing may well 
have changed Helms's estimates of the probabilities of reward for 
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consent (q) and punishment for objection (1-q'). Specifically, were 
Helms to have objected to the UCR for the King holiday, the chances of 
reaching an agreement for the Dairy and Tobacco Act would have been 
less likely. Similarly, were he to have retracted on his efforts to 
kill the popular King holiday bill (which ultimately passed 78-22), 
his chances for receiving cooperation during the relatively compact 
schedule were probably enhanced. Formally, the change in q was 
positive and the change in q' was negative. By propositions 4 and S, 
each of these changes should diminish the net expected benefit from 
objection. Of course we cannot be sure that had this scheduling not 
occurred, Helms would have continued his efforts to kill the King 
bill. It does seem reasonable to conclude, however, that the back to 
back scheduling of the two UCRs made violation of the norm of consent 
a much less desirable strategy. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The general statement of the theoretical result -- that senators 
frequently consent to UCRs because to do so maximizes expected utility 
-- is somewhat vacuous when considered alone. But if the cases 
examined are typical, the theoretical result takes on additional 
meaning in light of the observed tendency of the Senate leadership to 
exploit others' maximization calculi to induce cooperation, Several 
theorists who are interested in Congress have recently addressed the 
question of how cooperation evolves and persists in an institution 
that is presumably devoid of enforceable contracts. Their answers 
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vary but nevertheless share the view that bargains are rarely struck 
explicitly, and that even implicit deals are nonbinding. Nevertheless 
cooperative behavior occurs. Ferejohn (198S) , for example, attributes 
the instigation and persistence of food stamps and agricultural 
programs to jurisdictionally and preference induced logroll. Shepsle 
and Weingast (198S) argue that the reason committees rarely get 
"rolled" on the floor is neither because of the norm of deference nor 
because of insufficient temptations for noncommittee members to 
propose amendments, but rather because the committee possesses an ex 
post veto in the conference committee stage. And Axelrod (1984) 
offers interpretations of Congress based on his study of repeated play 
two-person prisoner' s dilemma games. The theoretical results on 
unanimous consent agreements are not necessarily inconsistent with 
such explanations; although UCAs are binding, members cannot be forced 
to enter into them nor can they be formally punished for reneging on 
implicit (or for that matter explicit) quid pro quos in the form of, 
say, mutual consent pacts. But the subtler and possibly unique 
empirical insight of the study is that the availability of 
institutional features such as the unanimous consent procedure permits 
clever leaders to construct situations in which potential defectors' 
extreme and very real temptations to object are accompanied by severe 
costs. Certainly such was the case for Jesse Helms during 
consideration of the UCR for the bill to establish a Martin Luther 
King, Jr. Holiday. So even though no contracts exist in such 
situations, leaders can and do schedule UCRs such that virtual 
contracts are drawn up. Moreover (and figuratively speaking) , even 
the "free spirit" senators who consider the terms of such contracts 
find it very difficult not to sign. 
3S 
A related but mostly tacit theme in this study is endogeneity of 
institutional arrangements. Some theorists have suggested that if 
members of an institution are permitted to change its rules (as 
senators do whenever they enter into a UCA), then many or most of the 
"chaos theorems" (HcKelvey, 1976 ; Schofield, 1978; etc.) ought to be 
straightforwardly transportable to the sphere of institutional choice, 
except that perhaps preferences on institutional arrangements are 
relatively "congealed" (Riker 1980) . One possible problem with this 
view is its implicit assumption that politicians know a great deal 
about the effects of alternative institutional arrangments. But a 
better argument against the dizzying prospects of endless cycling over 
the space of institutional arrangements pertains to the "unanimous" in 
UCAs. UCAs impose agendas on senators, moreover, agendas which are 
remarkably binding whereas a UCA can be rescinded only by another UCA. 
Theoretically, then, the only way to cycle over these endogenously 
chosen institutional arrangements would be for all senators to change 
their minds. A necessary condition for chaos in institutional choice 
therefore would be extreme fluidity of preferences. Since empirically 
this is an unlikely prospect, the endogeneity of institutional 
arrangements such as UCAs would seem to induce stability -- not 
undermine it. Considering the empirical fact that UCAs are reached 
with increasing frequency (albeit sometimes painstakingly) , and 
deferring the difficult question of what form such UCAs take, one 
might conjecture that there exist endogenous structure induced 
equilibria (ESIE) , a la Shepsle's SIE which in contrast take the 
institutions as given. In other words equilibrium outcomes may be 
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predicted even when the "structures" are situation-specific and chosen 
endogenously. Theoretical speculation aside, however, the more 
reliable point is that institutional features such as UCAs are 
frequently employed real world cases of institutional endogeneity and 
thus fertile testing grounds for forthcoming theories of institutional 
choice. 
Summarizing more narrowly, this study has introduced an explicit 
strategic perspective on congressional norms and has assessed its 
usefulness for answering the question of when and why senators go 
along with unanimous consent requests. The reasonably close 
correspondence between the theory and the cases suggests that norm-
related strategies vary in systematic and potentially predictable 
ways. This is not to claim confirmation of the theory, but only to 
underscore the hopeful prospects for continued study of congressional 
behavior using the strategic perspective. To reiterate, norms are not 
collective and constant codes of behavior but individual and variable 
strategic decisions. Congressmen have good reasons for behaving 
consistently with norms and equally good reasons for violating them. 
APPENDIX 
Theorem. A senator will object to a unanimous consent request on 
issue x if and only if 
.!! 
A. 
u 
q - q' 
1 - p 
- A. Proof. First note that u + u = l, since by definition 
,.. ,.. iI - - A. = u1Cx) + u2 (y) and u u1 (x) + u2Cy). Adding and rearranging 
yields 
- ,.. u + u 
- A. ,.. -
[u1 (x) + u2 (y)] + [u1 (x) + u2 (y)] 
- A. u(x, y) + 
A. -
u(x, y) 
1 + 0 
1. 
(by AS) 
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The remainder of the proof consists of simple algebraic manipulations 
and occasional use of the fact that u + � 1. 
II <=> 
<=> 
- ,.. q' - pq + [ (1-q') -p (l-q)]u - (1-p)qu > 
- - - - ,.. ,.. 
q' - pq + u - q'u + pqu - pu - qu + pqu 
pqCu + � - 1> + q' - q'u - q� + u - pu 
q' - q'u 
,.. 
- qu + u - pu 
- ,.. - -
q • (1 - u) - qu + u - pu 
A. A. 
pu q'u - qu + ii -
,.. -u (q' - q) + U(l - p) 
q' - q 
+ .!! > 0 ,.. 
1 - p u 
.!! 
q - q' 
,.. > 
u 1 - p 
> 
> 
> 0 
> 0 
0 
0 
0 (3) 
> 0 
> 0 
Q.E.D. 
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FOOTNOTES 
• I am grateful to Tom Gilligan and Doug Rivers for helpful 
conversations and comments, and to Walter Oleszek for bringing 
the cases to my attention. 
1 .  Alan Ehrenhalt, kQ, April 7, 1984, p .  819 .  
2 .  Robert Keith's (1977) comprehensive historical study of unanimous 
consent agreements (UCAs) is the only focused treatment of UCAs 
of which I am aware . See also Oleszek (1984, pp. 161-164) , part 
of which is based on Keith's study. 
3 .  Oleszek (1976) provides an impressive catalogue of dilatory 
tactics that are permitted under the normal rules . 
4. My excerpts from Matthews probably overstate his actual views. 
Other portions of his chapter on folkways are more consistent 
with the decision-theoretic approach I take below. 
s .  A contrasting case in which the normative consequences are less 
desirable (but no less rational) is Weingast's (1979) Hnorm of 
universalism, H  generalized in Shepsle and Weingast (1981) . 
6 .  See CQ Weekly Report, Oct. 8, 1983, p .  2076 . 
7 .  All excerpts are from the October 5, 1983 Congressional Record, 
pp . s 13608-17 . 
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8 .  He went on, however, to 
compliment the dairy people, because their answer • • •  to 
the Secretary of Agriculture was in the negative, [and] that 
they want no part of the type of involvement in the 
subterfUge that takes place on a daily basis • • • in the 
Senate Chamber . Once again, it substantiates the fact that 
laws . 
there are two things people do not want to see done 
watching sausage made and watching a legislature pass 
9 .  The precise locations of the points in figure 3 is not central to 
the argument, provided that the indifference curves of objectors 
are eliptical in the manner shown. 
10 . The specific amendments were not mentioned in the UCR. 
11 . Except where quoted, the provisions are paraphrased from the 
Congressional Record . Quotations that follow are all extracted 
from the Record, October 5, 1983, pp. S 13606-13608 . 
12 . Indeed his amendments were defeated 16-74 and 11-83 . 
13 . One of his amendments was to change the date of the holiday to 
the third Sunday in January; the other was to move the Lincoln 
holiday to Sunday instead of having a King holiday . When arguing 
for each amendment, he stressed the money they would save. 
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